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Commentary
The
Carpio Formula, the Philippine-Style Party-List
System and Social Justice
Any
seat allocation formula that imposes a seat-capping mechanism on
the Party-list proportional representation voting system contradicts
the social justice provision of the 1987 Constitution.
By
Felix P. Muga II,
Senior Fellow
Center for People’s Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG)
April 27, 2009
Finally,
after ten years of mixed membership, the House of Representatives
will have 20% of its members coming from the Party-list (proportional
representation) voting system. This 20-percent constitutional mandate
is fulfilled by the new Supreme Court (SC) ruling on April 21, 2009.
For the first time in ten years, the number of party-list groups
has grown to more than 30 parties, thereby broadening the participation
of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of our society.
We note, however, that not all of these parties are genuine representatives
of these sectors. We hope that in 2010, the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) will do its job properly in the accreditation of Party-list
groups and give the members of civil society enough time to scrutinize
its list of accredited parties and their respective nominees for
the Party-list election.
Proportional
representation and social justice
One of the state policies put forward by the framers of the 1987
Constitution is found in Section 10, Article II which provides that
“The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.” A social justice tool designed for our Legislative
Department is the election of Party-list representatives which comprise
20 percent of the House of Representatives.
In the senatorial election, a voter chooses 12 candidates from a
list of senatorial candidates and 12 winners will be proclaimed
by the Comelec. However, in the Party-list election, a voter chooses
only one party from a list of accredited Party-list groups –
and there are more than one winning parties with one or more seats.
The allocation of seats to the winning parties must be done fairly
and in proportion to the votes that each winning party received.
Thus, the Party-list system is inherently a proportional representation
voting system. The principle of proportional representation is the
fourth inviolable parameter of the Philippine-style Party-list system
according to the SC.
The democratic principle of proportional representation simply means
that the percent share of seats of a winning party must be equal,
if not almost equal, to its percent share of the total votes of
all parties qualified to receive a seat. Thus, if a party has 10
percent of the total votes then it must be awarded 10 percent of
the total seats. If it is not possible to award 10 percent of the
total seats, then the percent share of seats must be close enough
to 10 percent and the difference should not be more than the equivalent
of one seat. That is, if there are 55 available Party-list seats,
then the difference between the percent share of votes and the percent
share of seats should not be more than 1/55 or 1.81818 percent.
The Carpio formula and the four inviolable parameters
In its recent ruling, the high court still maintains that the Philippine-style
Party-list system must be governed by four INVIOLABLE parameters
as stated in the Veterans Case:
- “The
twenty percent allocation
- The combined number of all Party-list congressmen shall not
exceed 20 percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the Party list.” This is the
first inviolable parameter.
The high court rules that there are 55 available party-list seats.
The 20 percent mandate means that for every four congressional
district representatives there is one Party-list representative.
Thus, the ratio between the number of Party-list representatives
and the number of congressional districts is 1:4. Since the high
court maintains that there are 220 congressional districts, it
follows that the number of Party-list representatives is 220/4
= 55. Hence, in its recent ruling the 55 party-list seats are
all filled up.
But, isn’t it that there are only 219 congressional districts
since Sharif Kabunsuan and Cotabato City are merged into one congressional
district? This gives us 219/4 = 54.75 and 55 is more than 20 percent.
- “The
two percent threshold — Only those parties garnering
a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in
the House of Representatives”. This is the second inviolable
parameter.
The two-percent threshold is the minimum share of votes required
by the Party-list law to qualify for a seat. It does not guarantee
that a party is entitled to a seat. Note that if the qualifying
threshold is 1 percent and there are 50 available seats, then
a party with 1 percent of the votes is not guaranteed to be given
a seat but it may receive a seat if there is a second round of
seat allocation. Only those with 2 percent or more are assured
of a seat.
The Carpio formula allocates a guaranteed seat to those parties
that qualify for a seat. The Carpio formula did not use the latest
Comelec data in its computation. It based its computation on the
Party-List Canvass Report No. 32, dated August 2007 and not on
the Party-List Canvass Report No. 33. Thus, it allocated 17 guaranteed
seats instead of 18 since YACAP had 1.97 percent of the total
votes in the old canvass report but had 2.069 percent in the new
canvass report.
Although the SC ruled that the 2 percent qualifying threshold
is an inviolable parameter, it awarded one seat each to those
that did not qualify to receive a seat in the second round of
seat allocation.
Thus, the two percent threshold is not inviolable after all.
- “The
three-seat limit — Each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and two
additional seats.” This is the third inviolable parameter.
Actually, this is the only parameter of the Philippine-style Party-list
system that is not violated by the Carpio formula.
- “Proportional
representation — The additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to
their total number of votes.” This is the fourth inviolable
parameter.
In the latest Party-list canvass report, BUHAY has 7.29705 percent
of the total votes and it is awarded 3 seats or 5.45455 percent
of the total number of seats by the Carpio formula. The difference
is 1.84251 percent. This is equivalent to more than 1 seat. This
means that the Carpio formula denies BUHAY with 1 seat.
Thus, proportional representation is not an inviolable parameter.
It is very clear that the four inviolable parameters of the Philippine-style
Party-list system are inconsistent with each other and any seat
allocation formula that will adopt these parameters is bound to
such inconsistency by upholding one or two parameters and compromising
the others.
The error in the first inviolable parameter can easily be corrected
by using the correct number of congressional districts.
However, the 20 percent constitutional mandate cannot be filled
up if the 3-seat cap is imposed. Thus, the 2 percent qualifying
threshold is compromised in the second round of the Carpio formula.
Parties with more than 6 percent of the total votes are penalized
if they get more than 3 seats by the Carpio Formula. The effect
is denying these parties of the seats that are rightfully theirs.
Hence, the 3-seat cap violates the democratic of proportional representation
which is one of the principles of social justice.
With the imposition of the 3-seat cap in our Party-list proportional
representation voting system, the State does not promote social
justice but instead negates its development.
Therefore, any seat allocation formula that imposes a seat-capping
mechanism on the Party-list proportional representation voting system
contradicts the social justice provision of the 1987 Constitution.
Felix
P. Muga II is an Associate Professor, Mathematics Department, Ateneo
de Manila University; Visiting Professor, Mathematics Department,
Silliman University; Board Member and Senior Fellow, Center for
People’s Empowerment in Governance. Email: lexmuga@gmail.com,
fmuga@ateneo.edu
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