PARTY-LIST ELECTIONS: Fraud, Voters Disenfranchisement,
a Flawed System, and Other Problems
(Paper Presented During the Center for People Empowerment in Governance Discussion on an Assessment of the Philippine Party-List System, Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, November 29, 2007)

By Bobby Tuazon(1)

Under the 1987 Constitution, the Party-list system is mandated to allow the country’s marginal and under-represented sectors represented in Congress, particularly in the House of Representatives. Its unprecedented inclusion in the Constitution was pushed by members of the Constitutional Commission for progressive people’s organizations representing the basic masses that struggled against the Marcos dictatorship to have an effective voice in policy legislation.

The Party-list system of election is a mechanism of proportional representation for the election of representatives to the House of Representatives coming from marginalized or underrepresented national, regional and sectoral parties, or organizations or coalitions registered with the Commission on Elections (Comelec). It is part of the electoral process that enables small political parties and marginalized and underrepresented sectors to obtain representation in the House, which traditionally has been dominated by parties with big political machineries or oligarchic parties.(2)

In its article on Legislative Department, the Constitution provides:

"[1] x x x The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations;

"[2] The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector;

"[3] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative

In 2001, the Supreme Court explained that under RA 7941, the party-list group "must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives." (3)

To review, the Comelec in its own primer, clarifies that only registered organized groups may participate in the Party-list elections, breaking these down into: a) Sectoral Party – an organized group of citizens whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of the following sectors: labor, fisherfolk, peasant, women, urban poor, youth, indigenous cultural communities, overseas workers, veterans, professionals, handicapped, and the elderly; b) Sectoral Organization – a group of qualified voters bound together by similar physical attributes or characteristics, or by employment, interests or concerns; c) Sectoral Political Party – an organized group of qualified voters pursuing the same ideology, political ideas and principles for the general conduct of the government. It may be: A national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions; or a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising a region; d) Coalition – an aggrupation of duly-registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.

In the case of a regional sectoral political party, what is meant by the phrase "spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region"? In its own words, the Comelec clarifies that “’majority’ means a number higher than 50%. Thus, if a region consists of, say, five cities and six provinces, in order to obtain the required majority, the party should have chapters in three cities and provincial offices in four provinces.”

In determining the national constituency for a national sectoral political party, what is meant by the phrase "spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions"? Again, the Comelec says "’majority’" means a number higher than 50 percent. Since the country is composed of sixteen regions, including CAR, ARMM and CARAGA, the party should have regional offices in at least nine regions in order to constitute a majority of the regions in the country.”

While the high court in the same 2001 decision said that nominees of the Party list “must represent marginalized or underrepresented sectors,” it remains fuzzy whether the nominees themselves should come from such sectors – or, rather classes - in demographic terms. Judicial challenges have yet to seek clarification on this contentious issue, according to a former member of the Constitutional Commission, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas.(4)

Party-list representatives were at first appointed by President Corazon C. Aquino from 1987 to June 30, 1992 while elections for the new system would take place only after the implementing law was enacted by Congress in 1995 (RA No. 7941). (5)

There have been four mid-term Party-list elections since RA 7941 came into effect: in 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007.

This briefing paper is a contribution to the partial assessment of the Party-list elections and one of the steps toward resolving several contentious issues on this innovative legislative component.

Initially, it is disconcerting to find that since 1998 until the recent mid-term elections the number of Party-list groups aspiring for a seat in the House has dwindled. Correspondingly, the number of representatives elected has not reached the constitutionally-determined number of slots reserved for the Party-list, with the number either remaining steady or even lesser as elections went.

There are statistical, legal and political reasons that may explain this trend.

I. Number of registered voters

First off, the total number of registered voters for the four elections covered by this assessment were: 34,000,000 in 1998 (out of 76.1 million population); 36,521,799 in 2001 (out of 81.1 million population); 43,536,028 in 2004 (out of 87.8 million population); and 43,083,723 in 2007 (out of 91,077,287, July 2007 estimated population). (6)

The total number of voters who actually voted out of the registered voters in the four elections was: about 29.2 million, or 86.4 percent in 1998; about 27.7 million or 76.3 percent in 2001; about 34 million or 78 percent in 2004; and 29,984,421 or 69.5 percent (of the registered voters in 2007). (7)

The number of voters who cast their votes in the Party-list contest out of the total registered voters was: 9,155,309 (1998, or only 26.9 percent); 15,118,815 in 2001 or 41.39 percent; 12,721,952 (2004 or 29.2 percent); and 15,950,900 (2007 or 37.02 percent).

The total votes garnered by the qualified Party-list groups out of the total votes cast in the Party-elections were: 3,429,338 in 1998, for 13 winning parties or 37.45 percent; 5,059,483 in 2001, for the 12 winning parties, or 33.4 percent; 8,175,452 in 2004, for the 16 winning parties or 64.2 percent; and 8,802,231 in 2007, for the 17 winning parties or 55 percent.

There was a consistent increase in the total number of registered voters in the four elections covered. The growth rate increase was 6.5 percent (1998-2001) and 3.8 percent (between 2001-2002, when there was a scheduled barangay election). However, there was an atypical big leap of 15.4 percent from 2002 to 2004.

Conversely, except in 2004 (78 percent), there was a steady decline in the number of voters who actually voted, from 86.4 percent in 1998, 76.3 percent in 2001, and 69.5 percent in 2007. (Namfrel’s Edward Go had an initial estimate of 50 to 60 percent who actually voted in the May 2007 polls.)

Out of the total number of registered voters, the total votes cast for the Party-list elections represented a low of 26.9 percent (1998) and a relatively high of 41.39 percent (2001). The number of votes cast for the 2007 Party-list election was 37 percent. Discomforting, however, is the fact that of the total votes cast for the Party-list contest, an average of 47.5 percent was counted in to qualify for seats allocated for the system, with the rest of the votes technically not represented for various reasons.

II. Number of Party-list groups

A total of 122 Party-list groups were accredited by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in the 1998 elections, with only 13 making it or 10.6 percent of those qualified (i.e., those who met the 2 percent threshold needed based on the total votes cast to get one seat); 46 participated in the 2001 elections (12 made it or 26.08 percent); 66 in the 2004 elections (16 made it or 24.2 percent); and 92 in the 2007 mid-term elections (with 16 winning or 17.4 percent). The number of seats taken in those elections, out of 52 to 55 possible maximum slots for the Party-list, was: 14 seats in 1998; 20 in 2001; 24 in 2004; and 22 in 2007.

Ironically, based only on the Comelec and, later, Panganiban formulas – but not discounting other probable reasons – the number of votes that would qualify a Party-list to take one seat over the period has risen and this was attended by a corresponding leap in the number of voters that technically were not counted, not represented, or were disenfranchised in the final allocation of seats. To be specific: in 1998, the number of qualified votes per seat was 65,948 while the number of votes technically not represented was 2,506,024, with 38 seats not filled up; in 2001, a seat needed 97,397 votes, with 3,113,504 voters not represented, leaving 32 seats not occupied; in 2004, there were 151,397 votes per seat and 4,541,910 voters not represented, leaving 30 seats unfilled; and, finally, in 2007 there were 160,040 votes per seat, with 5,121,280 voters not represented with 32 seats vacant. (8)

Starting from a high of 122 Party-list groups in the 1998 elections, the number of groups participating has dropped. The entry of allegedly fake Party-list groups in the 2001 elections somewhat changed this downward course. Moreover, the number of seats actually occupied based on the four elections covered did not reach beyond 50 percent. For reasons yet to be threshed out, there has been a steady increase in the number of votes needed for a Party-list group to fulfil the 2 percent treshold and qualify for one seat. On the other hand, at least one Party-list, Bayan Muna, had been able to surpass the number of votes corresponding to more than three seats but the 3-seat cap has made it impossible to win more seats even if based on the 2 percent threshold thus leaving a sizeable chunk of voters technically unrepresented.

There are several reasons for these varied problems.

III. On the low turn-out of voters for the Party-list

The period covering the four elections has shown no significant increase in the number of registered voters casting their ballot for the Party-list system. On the surfare, this may signify that the pattern of voting among many voters generally remains toward the traditional presidential, district representation, and local government races with no significant voting response to the Party-list system which at least, as the Constitution implies, promises policy-making representation for the marginal sectors.

This can be explained partly by voters’ low awareness on the Party-list system. Furthermore, the dominant tendency in elections where voting is decided on personalities influences most people to exercise their right to vote on the traditional mode of accessing political power to the detriment of issues and programs that the Party-list system – at least from groups that are keen on making it functional for the marginalized and underrepresented – offers. In this regard, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) has been constantly reminded to discharge its mandated role in making the voters more informed about the Party-list system. The national poll body had all 20 years – including the period from the ratification of the Constitution to the time the enabling law on the Party-list system was enacted, and then the first four elections – for it to conduct a voter’s education drive about this innovation to the legislative institution. This neglect has led some Party-list groups to integrate the information drive about the system into their election campaign often with great logistical cost.

The Philippine trimedia’s reportage of elections has also tended to provide more focus on national, senatorial and local elections, and very little on the Party-list contest except on election-related incidents such as arrests and harassments. In its analysis of tri-media coverage of the May 2007 elections, the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) noted that newspapers devoted only 4.9 percent of their space to the Party-list contest on election day, with the same trend observed in major TV and radio networks.(9)

Another explanation is the large-scale disenfranchisement of voters that can be attributed to flawed Comelec election supervision, institutional deficiencies as well as various types of cheating, fraud and violence.

Particularly flawed was the May 2004 election, which is the continuing subject of large-scale cheating allegations and investigations involving President Gloria M. Arroyo. A report by the IFES pictures what happened on election day(10) :

“Election Day was marred by numerous logistical, procedural, and organizational problems. Many voters did not know where to vote, precincts and polling stations were poorly organized, and voters’ lists were inaccurate. A poorly designed ballot and crowded polling locations in urban areas made voting difficult and did not protect the secrecy of the vote. Numerous procedures were not understood or were ignored due to poor training and weak supervision. The counting process was painfully slow due to complicated ballots and unnecessary procedures. ..The tabulation process, known as canvassing, is complex. Despite numerous safeguards, it suffers from the perception of fraud…This leaves excessive room for delay and politicization, as was vividly demonstrated in this election.”

On top of this, the IFES report added:

“Voter education efforts were uncoordinated and poorly implemented. Often, voters were not informed of new precinct information instructing them where to vote. The training of polling officials was done through parallel training programs developed by the Department of Education, COMELEC, and civil society. Ironically, COMELEC’s training was the least effective of the three and the most poorly organized, relying on broadcast lectures to groups of up to 500 and the distribution of a General Instructions document on polling in lieu of a proper training curriculum.”

In fact, COMELEC did not have an effective voter education campaign. IFES’ report continues: “Civil society organizations such as PPCRV tried to step in to inform voters on how to register and how to vote, but their efforts were often frustrated by the lack of guidance or materials from COMELEC. Barangay captains also played an important role in providing voter information to the public regarding their precinct. Other voter education efforts by civil society actors focused on general messages of participation in the political process. Not only is COMELEC bound by law to perform voter education activities, it will benefit from making sure that voters know exactly how to cast their vote and what will happen to their vote. COMELEC needs to regain the confidence of the public; one important tool could be a simple, sustained, and strong voter education program.”

Field reports filed by the People’s International Observers Mission (IOM) which observed the May 2007 elections in key provinces, amplified these election problems.(11) The report noted “numerous weaknesses, anomalies, and violations…contributing to the manipulation of election results.”

The IOM also said:

“In the polling places, there was general chaos and countless voters were unable to vote or had a difficult time in voting. No voters’ lists were posted outside polling precincts. Many failed to vote because they could not find their names on any list; without notice to voters concerned, names were transferred to another precinct’s list. Voters’ lists that seem suspiciously outdated, with names of those deceased still listed while names of the living were omitted. (There was) deactivation without notice of hundreds of voters who were relocated to a nearby province; absence of Ballot Secrecy Folders with attached lists of candidates at national and local positions; late delivery or lack of election paraphernalia causing much delay; and requent re-assignment of election officers resulting in further chaos and raising doubts that the newly appointed ones are supporters of incumbent officials running for reelection.”

In a separate report issued on May 21, 2007, Kontra Daya, another pollwatch group whose convenors included members of faith communities, former top government officials, and leaders of people’s organizations based nationwide, cited similar reports of voters’ disenfranchisement. “To date,” Kontra Daya said, “there has been no satisfactory explanation from the COMELEC as to the disenfranchisement of voters (which some estimate may reach up to a 100,000 voters(12) )…In our dialogue with the COMELEC as early as February 27, we already called on the poll body to release the voters’ list and precinct assignments early enough. Chairman Benjamin Abalos promised that the list would be released by March but this was not done.” (13)

A tight, field monitoring of the May 14, 2007 elections conducted by the Task Force Poll Watch (TFPA) through its hundreds of volunteers likewise revealed, in in its report, “deliberate disenfranchisement of voters, coercion of voters and pollwatchers, and election-related abductions and killings.”(14) Aside from other victims of election violence, the progressive Party-list (PPL) bloc of Bayan Muna, Anakpawis, Gabriela Women’s Party, as well as Suara Bangsamoro and Kabataan Party suffered from deliberate and widespread voters’ disenfranchisement reportedly due to military harassment, intimidation, as well as physical attacks.

CenPEG, in an edition of its series of “Election Forensics” media releases, noted:(15)

“In Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pampanga, Bataan, Laguna, Cavite, the Bicol provinces, Samar, Bohol, Negros Occidental, Compostela Valley, Misamis Occidental and other provinces known to be bailiwicks of the PPLs, masses of voters were disenfranchised as a result of alleged military and police intimidation and psywar tactics. Voters including barangay officials were warned not to vote for the PPLs otherwise the military would ‘get back at them,’ poll watchers reported. Threats and intimidation prevented thousands of voters from going to the polling precincts.

“During the election, moreover, many PPL poll watchers were barred by police, armed goons and, in many cases, by election officials from entering the canvassing areas. Two young poll watchers of Kabataan were abducted on May 15 in Capalonga, Camarines Norte. Their bodies were found two days later. In other separate incidents, three more coordinators of Anakpawis and BM also went missing in Cagayan Valley and Palawan.

“Human rights groups and poll watchers in these provinces say that the government sabotage of the PPLs’ electoral machine has been years in the making. Its latest phase began right after the 2004 elections which was topped by BM, with AP and GWP also gaining seats…

“In the recent elections, it is widely believed that the government sabotage of the PPL machinery also included the deployment of about 200 soldiers in 23 barangays of the National Capital Region (NCR) to conduct anti-PPL propaganda; the fielding of at least 22 fake Party-lists and their accreditation by Comelec; meetings allegedly organized by top police officials lecturing local Comelec officials about the PPLs’ ‘threat’; and so on.”

A report by the Philippine Daily Inquirer in July 2007 cited a top secret document issued by the presidential office that appeared to confirm government hand in the systematic neutralization of Bayan Muna and its allied political parties. The document, titled “The Bayan Muna Party-list Victory and the Prospects for its Wider National and Local Political Participation,” was prepared after BM topped the party-list election in May 2001 and before the barangay elections in July 2002 that were later canceled. It was authored by the Knowledge Management Division of the Office of the Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns in October 2003.(16)

Aside from other factors, poll watch groups agreed that the immediate impact of this sabotage of the election machinery of the PPLs was a reduction in their number of votes, effectively reducing their overall House seats from six, which was garnered in 2004, to five in 2007. Pre-election surveys noted that at least six out of 10 people believed the elections would be fraudulent but there was no clear projection that this would have an adverse effect on the Party-list system.

Yet another type of voters’ disenfranchisement is the exclusion of a big number of overseas absentee voters (OAVs) from voting during the first four PL elections. In the last May 2007 elections, only 20 percent of half-a-million registered OAVs cast their votes. A report by the Department of Foreign Affairs however disputed the Comelec claim, saying that only 44,976 Filipinos or 8.9 percent of the registered OAV voters cast their ballots.(17) This dismal performance can also be attributed to the fact that only 504,122 OAVs registered for the 2007 elections, and 358,660 for the 2004. A big number of the 8 million Filipinos working abroad, including dual-citizen Filipinos, constitute a big cluster of overseas voters. In the U.S., for instance, where there are about 3-4 million Filipinos, the OAVs include permanent residents, contract workers, dual citizens, and other categories of overseas Filipinos.

IV. Other problems regarding the conduct of recent Party-list elections and why the total seat allocation for PL representatives has not been met

In the first four elections, cheating, fraud, violence, and other incidents of anomalies inevitably affected the conduct of elections for the Party-list system. Criticisms about the failure or difficulties of the Comelec to ensure an honest and democratic election in both national and local races inevitably raised the same concern with regard to the Party-list contests.

One of the main problems regarding the documentation and investigation of elections has been the attention focused on presidential and senatorial contests with minimal concern given to the Party-list polls. It was only until recently, however, that the need to guarantee fair and democratic elections for the Party-list as well became a priority particularly among non-government election watchdogs with some of these groups, alarmed by the election structural deficiencies and by the May 2004 fraud, opting even to guard the performance of Comelec officials. It also came as a coincidence that the Party-list polls attracted some media coverage over reports of the Arroyo administration and some politicians trying to subvert the process by fielding and supporting groups to run over the protests of many Party-list groups.(18)

The reports of pollwatch groups, international observers’ missions, and the media noted that the Party-list system has been impaired by fraud and violence that traditionally plagues the politics of the presidency, regular Congress, and the local elective offices. Aside from intimidation and other acts of violence, the Party-list system has also been tarnished by reports of vote buying and flying voters; cheating and manipulation (vote-padding and vote-shaving, tampering with ERs, SoVs, and CoCs); deliberate delay of voters’ lists; as well as reports of bribery involving election officials and other personnel.

In its partial assessment of the May 2007 mid-term elections for the Party-list, TFPW documented fraud incidents affecting the PPLs in at least 60 provinces in 14 regions. Clarifying this point, CenPEG’s Election Forensics revealed that the number of documented incidents reached 600 based only on partial reports. Many of the incidents involved military and police forces, election officials, as well as a number of Party-list groups. The incidents included vote buying, deliberate disenfranchisement of voters, tampering of election results (ERs), statements of votes (SOVs) and certificates of canvass (CoCs), bloating voters’ lists, allowing inflated votes cast, vote padding/vote shaving and other irregularities in election procedures, electioneering, escorting flying voters, coercion of voters and pollwatchers. TFPW, in the same report, said the military was involved in at least 214 of these documented cases.

In the vote-shaving cases alone, the PPLs lost nearly 300,000 votes, TFPW initially reported. There were almost 30 legal cases of massive fraud filed with the Comelec but with no significant progress despite RA 9369 and properly documented complaints. Subsequent reports received by the TFPW showed that the total number of votes shaved from the PPLs can reach up to 2 million.

Vote padding in the Party-list polls fallaciously increased the number of votes “counted” compared to the actual votes cast, thus increasing the 2 percent threshold that a Party-list should muster to gain one seat. This, in turn, victimized in particular small Party-list groups. Moreover, this manipulation increased the chances of at least 3 to 5 Party-lists out of the more than 22 formed and supported allegedly by the administration to garner seats in the House at the expense of the genuine Party-lists.

The accreditation of the 22 Party-list groups allegedly backed and financially supported by Malacanang and politicians allied to the administration also contributed to the artificial bloating of the 2 percent threshold, again effectively undermining the chances of smaller Party-list groups that could not compete with the well-oiled machinery of the so-called fake ones. Many of the votes cast for the Party list was dispersed among many small parties, thus decreasing their chances of gaining a single seat. Many Party-list groups issued a collective voice of protest against their accreditation by Comelec and called for a reconsideration of their accreditaion. Nothing came out of it.

On the other hand, vote shaving against specific partylist groups robbed citizens of their choices to represent their specific interests in the legislature.

Meanwhile, criticisms are mounting especially among Party-list groups that truth and precision regarding the actual results of recent and even of previous elections cannot be established precisely because of the dearth of data provided by the Comelec, particularly figures that are based on the certificates of canvass (CoCs) and statements of votes (SoVs) coming from the municipal and city levels. Granted that these are available, the veracity and authenticity of the data would be difficult to establish given the manipulation and tampering of election outcome that has been widespread throughout the country election after election.

Aside from these, there are perceived flaws in the mathematical allocation of seats prescribed by RA 7941 which prevents party-list candidates from gaining at least a seat in the House of Representatives and from filling up the 20 percent membership in this lower chamber.(19) (This will be explained in a separate paper by Ateneo Professor and CenPEG Fellow Felix Muga II.)

Of note is Comelec’s explanation with regard to the 3-seat cap. Its primer says that in the party-list system, “no single party may hold more than three party-list seats.” Yet this is followed by an explanation that appears to rationalize the setting of the 3-seat cap to prevent traditional political parties from dominating the Party-list elections. To quote: “Bigger parties which traditionally will dominate elections cannot corner all the seats and crowd out the smaller parties because of this maximum ceiling. This system shall pave the way for smaller parties to also win seats in the House of Representatives.”

While this may be appreciated, the 3-seat cap actually deters qualified sectoral parties or organizations that have large constituencies representing marginal classes or sectors to qualify for more seats proportionate to their numbers but are constrained by the technical limit. In fact, Comelec should instead be asked whether as a powerful supervisory body it has upheld the constitutional mandate of the Party-list system to make sure that it genuinely represents marginal sectors and enhances their chances of gaining seats while preventing traditional political parties or those supported by the powers that be from undermining it.

Moreover, there have also been several legal battles attendant to the Party-list elections, questions regarding misrepresentation by groups claiming to speak for the poor, continuing attempts by traditional political parties and politicians to use the system as a means of widening their political base, and so on. Not a few of these legal battles involve the Comelec. In 1998, for instance, 12 of 13 winners proclaimed by the Comelec as winners in the Party-list elections objected to the proclamation of 38 other Party-list groups, insisting that only the organizations with at least 2 percent of the total votes cast for the Party-list system are entitled to House seats.(20) The protest ended in the Supreme Court (SC) which, in turn, identified three areas of contention: 1) Is the 20 percent allocation for Party-list representative mandatory or just a ceiling?; 2) Are the 2 percent treshold requirement and the 3-seat cap as provided by RA 7941 constitutional?; and 3) If the answer to Item b is yes, how should the additional seats be determined?

In an en banc decision on Oct. 6, 1998, the SC ruled that: 1) the 20 percent allocation for Party-list seats in the House of Representatives is not mandatory, based on Section 5 (2) of the 1987 Constitution; 2) the 2 percent threshold is necessary for a party to obtain representation. It also promulgated a mathematical formula that led to the confirmation of 14 Party-list representatives that were earlier proclaimed by the Comelec.

Aspects of this ruling including what would later become the “Panganiban formula” remain the subject of contemplated legal actions for review because, taken in the context of the subversion or, as some quarters would put it, “bastardization” of the Party-list system, such ruling, in the perception of many, does not contribute to the full realization of the democratic let alone proportional representation of marginalized sectors.

By any stretch of the imagination, “traditional political parties” as mentioned in the Comelec primer should refer to oligarchic political parties that have dominated Congress over the past 100 years, and they constitute roughly 70 to 80 percent of the regular mebership of the House of Representatives today. Is it asking too much if the 20 percent of the seats allocated for the marginal sectors be deemed at least as absolutely mandatory considering that the Party-list groups are supposed to represent some 70 to 80 percent of the Philippines’ population that is considered poor?(21)

In a separate case in the Party-list elections of 2001, Bayan Muna (BM) asked the high court to disqualify political parties and organizations that did not represent marginalized and under-represented constituencies from participating in the polls. BM referred to such groups as Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), Laban Ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), Partido Ng Masang Pilipino (PMP), LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, Liberal Party, Mamamayang Ayaw Sa Droga, CREBA, National Federation Of Sugarcane Planters, JEEP, and, Bagong Bayani Organization. These groups were actually spin-offs of established political parties (i.e., Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), Laban Ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), Partido Ng Masang Pilipino (PMP), LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, Liberal Party, and JEEP) and groups that have big business affiliations. In its 2001 decision, the SC disqualified the groups from being voted, and in general, participating in the party-list elections.(22)

Overall, says David Wurfel, an American scholar who has been monitoring Philippine elections for years, the method of screening party-list parties and the procedure for allocating seats is still in dispute. “This denouement,” Wurfel says, “is the result, in part, of some old politicians trying to muddy the waters, to prevent the new mechanism from succeeding. The law is internally contradictory and quite confusing; even the Supreme Court has not adequately understood it. The COMELEC, despite the presence of a few excellent members, is more immersed in corruption and infighting than at any time in its history. So the future of all elections, not just party-list, is in jeopardy. There are recommendations for revision of the law before Congress, but there is not even consensus among NGOs about what changes should be made, let alone among members of Congress… If disputes among members of Congress, Supreme Court justices and the commissioners of COMELEC can be resolved in light of the experience of other countries, there is still hope that NGOs and POs will be better represented in the legislature. But the outcome is in doubt.”(23)

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End Notes