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30 Vulnerabilities & Safeguards in the AES 2010 : Promoting the Integrity of the Vote*
INTRODUCTION
The Automated Election Law (RA 9369) is a landmark legislation aimed at modernizing the election system in the Philippines. Not only does it recognize the need to pilot test the technology to be used before going full blast, it also ensures that the technology chosen should be “suitable to Philippine conditions.” It may have its own vague provisions such as Sections 30 down which still refer to manual elections, but over-all it is a law that is unique in that it provides major safeguards to help ensure the integrity of the vote, promote secret voting yet transparent and credible counting in the poll automation – in short, to make election a mechanism for making democracy work. Comelec, meanwhile, has only to comply with the law’s distinct provisions of safeguarding the elections in May 2010 to avoid the dangerous pitfalls of automated disaster.
The country’s prime election manager, the Commission on Elections (Comelec), sees the automation of elections as the answer to fraud and is also widely perceived by the public as guaranteeing clean elections in 2010. While automating the elections claims to give advantages such as speed and accuracy in tabulation, it can still lead to wholesale cheating if safeguards and security measures are not properly implemented especially in the counting and canvassing stages. In fact, modernizing the election system without substantially addressing systemic election fraud and dismantling the powerful cheating machineries that have also affected the Comelec organization will make the use of modern technology futile. A machine is “cognitive neutral” and it works as commanded by its operators – or manipulators. It needs the proper political environment to function well.
The whole AES process has 30+ vulnerabilities that the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) initially identified and also looked into by the Automated Election System (AES) 2010 Policy Study under the Dean’s Office of the University of the Philippines’ College of Law through painstaking studies. These phases in the AES process have been deemed vulnerable because these are where either cheating can take place or unclear rules of procedure and continuity plan lead to chaos or failure of elections. The vulnerabilities range from ballot printing, warehousing and delivery of machines, hardware and software deficiencies, voting, counting and electronic transmission of votes; to canvassing and proclamation of winners in 2-3 days.
These problems are largely due to Comelec’s own lack of capability to manage the AES and misinterpretation of RA 9369 (Automated Election System Law). As of this writing, certain provisions of RA 9369, such as the pilot testing of machines in 2 highly-urbanized cities (HUCs) and 2 provinces each in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao, as well as the source code review, have not been complied with. Added to this, are the serious questions regarding Comelec’s and the Comelec Advisory Council’s (CAC) information technology (IT) competency which impacts how these bodies handle, manage, and properly decide about the AES for 2010 which will use Smartmatic’s SAES-1800 (Smartmatic Auditable Election System) for counting and the REIS (Real-Time Electoral Information System) for canvassing. With their lack of proper IT competency, Comelec should seek wider consultations from various Filipino IT groups regarding the AES and SAES-1800 especially expert users groups of Linux which is the operating systems to be used in the AES May 2010 elections.
Furthermore, Comelec is already implementing the RA 9369 in the absence of Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) which they should have crafted immediately after the law was passed as well as the adjudication process of resolving electoral protests which should have been drafted by midyear to give time for legal minds to study. In light of this, Comelec should immediately publish its IRR so that political parties, poll watchdogs, and the general public are made aware of how Comelec will actually implement the AES and how it plans to deal with potential problems. Data for this list of vulnerable spots that should be plugged with proper safeguards are culled from months of studying Comelec’s actions and decisions regarding the AES, a critique of the RA 9369, observations of the bidding procedures, and technical assessment of the Request for Proposal/Terms of Reference and available literature regarding the machines. Consultations and workshops with IT professionals and lawyers were conducted to consolidate the data gathered.
The Comelec has revised the AES timetable six (6) times since April 2009 and each time, preparation for every activity is either shortened or removed altogether, e.g. the April 2010 ARMM election. Rushing and shortcutting the preparations without sufficient safeguards in place will endanger or worst spell “30” or finish to this P7.2B single biggest major election project in the world. It is the aim of this document to suggest interventions and safeguards for Comelec to adopt for each of the identified vulnerability and help ensure the integrity of the vote and transparency of the elections in May 2010. It is hoped that this matrix may serve as a “wake up” call for Comelec to be realistic and stop harboring illusions about the so called “dream polls” that will decide the next President, Vice President and other national and local leaders in 2-3 days. If the AES pushes through without the major safeguards in place, may this document serve as a guide and alert mechanism for poll watch groups, advocates for credible and peaceful elections, political parties and well-meaning candidates with regard to the vulnerable areas of the AES that they should guard and watch out for with greater vigilance, courage and devotion
This paper is being published in the interest of voter’s rights, the people’s right to public information, as well as government transparency and accountability. Permission is granted by the Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) for the use of this paper for research, analysis, public policy discussions, forums, and media reports with proper attribution to its publisher. CenPEG, an independent policy institute which is duly registered with the Philippines’ Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), reserves its copyright use and all legal remedies that it implies. CenPEG has been an official observer in Comelec’s bidding and procurement procedures, as well as in the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments which also conducts hearings related to the automated election.
For other papers, publications, and downloadable reference materials and PowerPoint presentations, please see www.cenpeg.org and www.aes2010.net.
August 28, 2009
Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG)
www.cenpeg.org; Email: cenpeg.info@gmail.com, info@cenpeg.org
3/F CSWCD Bldg., University of the Philippines
Magsaysay Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City 1101 Philippines
TelFax +9299526
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